Electoral Studies (1990), 9:2, 109–132

Individual Preferences, Social Mobility and Electoral Outcomes

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This paper models data for the Netherlands in the 1970s on prestige of male's occupation, occupational prestige of the father and 'left/right' score of the political party he prefers. One set of hypotheses holds that individuals behave according to economic self-interest, another set postulates a status motive. The former specify additive effects, the latter interaction effects. It is argued that these hypotheses have to be tested with Diagonal Mobility Models. A result of their application is that an economic diagonal model fits best.

This paper also discusses macroimplications of these models for individual data. To determine macroeffects of status models, it is necessary to ascertain the total percentage of mobile persons in a society. For the macro-application of economic models, the amount of mobility necessitated by a country's opportunity structure is relevant. The latter is much smaller than the former. As an economic model was corroborated, macroeffects of social mobility on a society's political outcome are smaller than might have been suspected.

Introduction

Background

In the 1970s and 1980s research within sociology on social stratification and mobility was given new impetus by large scale surveys in the United States (Featherman and Hauser, 1978) and Great Britain (Goldthorpe, 1980), by comparison between British data with data for France and Sweden (Erikson et al., 1983), and by a collation of the British data set with the US data set (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1985). After a long lull, sociology in the Netherlands, the country focused upon in this paper, regained interest in stratification and mobility research (Bakker *et al.,* 1984). All these empirical studies have taken personal characteristics (rank on the social ladder or position in the class structure, mobility along this ladder or within this structure) and characteristics of countries (stratification, mobility pattern) as dependent variables. In this article these characteristics are focused upon as independent variables. We deal with their effect on the political outcome in the Netherlands. Consequently, this article links up with an existing interest in effects of mobility within political science in the Netherlands (Andeweg, 1982), Great Britain (Abramson, 1972; Thorburn, 1979; Robertson, 1984) and the United States (Barber, 1970; Jackman, 1972; Knoke, 1973; Herz, 1986).

0261–3794/90/02/0109–24/$03.00

Hypotheses on the effect of a country's pattern of stratification and mobility on the political outcome are various and some have had a long history. More than a century ago Marx asserted the existence of class struggle, a point that has been repeated many times since. Societies, like the European ones at that time, were supposed to be divided into two classes. Namely, the owners of the means of production and the people who sell their labour. The different interests of these two classes result, accordingly, in class struggles. Later, social scientists divided labourers into blue and white collar workers and by doing so distinguished more classes (Geiger, 1932). According to other social scientists, struggles in industrial societies are seldom violent; they take the shape of electoral contests (Lipset, 1960: 230). Nearly every survey conducted in different Western industrialized nations after World War II, shows a positive relationship between a person's class position and this individual's 'right' wing preference. One current explanation for this regularity is economic self-interest (Lipset, 1960: 239).

From a Marxist point of view Parkin states, in an influential study from the early 1970s, that individuals from higher classes are a minority vis-à-vis persons from lower classes. Parkin also noticed that in England as well as in other industrial societies class-struggles were not settled in favour of the lower classes, even after the introduction of universal suffrage. According to Parkin this contradiction between Marxist theory and empirical findings raises the question of why the largest and least endowed group does not rebel more than it is presently doing (Parkin, 1970: 48).

A variant of this problem is the question of how it is possible that in nearly every survey in Western industrialized socities the relation between class and voting behaviour displays the same sign, but differs in strength. In the year Parkin's study appeared, Lenski and Lenski (1970: 362) published data on the relationship between class and voting behaviour for nine industrialized countries during the 1950s and 1960s. These data indeed show that in every country blue collar workers in general voted more 'left' wing than the remainder of the population, but at the same time they made clear that Alford's 'index of class voting' differed vastly between countries. (Alford's index is the percentage of left-wing blue collar workers minus the percentage of left-wing non-blue collar workers, see Alford, 1962). More than a decade later Korpi (1983) presented Alford's index for 18 industrialized countries at later points in time. These data displayed the same patterns as those of Lenski and Lenski.

An answer to similar questions, was given long ago by Sombart (1906). Sombart sought to account for the absence of socialism in the United States, where capitalism was most extensively developed. Sombart's answer was fourfold. First, the economic position of labourers in America was more favourable than in other countries. Second, these labourers had more political power; third, workers were more respected in the United States; and finally, workers in America were more upwardly mobile than labourers in Germany and other European countries.

After Sombart, social scientists primarily paid attention to consequences of upward mobility and other forms of mobility for a country's political situation. Dahrendorf made statements about mobility 'tout court' and maintained that the intensity of class struggle declines if various classes are more accessible (less closed) (Dahrendorf, 1959: 239). Lenski stipulated the effects of upward mobility. According to Lenski the distribution system of societies is characterized by (a) a certain degree of inequality, (b) a specific rate of vertical mobility, and (c) a certain

intensity of class struggle. Based on the last two characteristics Lenski formulated the hypothesis that 'the degree of class hostility tends to vary inversely with the rate of upward mobility' (Lenski, 1966: 86). Parkin used the image of upward mobility as a political safety-valve. The importance of Parkin's study is that it explicitly discusses downward mobility. The hypothesis is that political attachment of the downwardly mobile does not change sufficiently to resemble their class of destination, but rather, to a large extent, still reflects their origin (Parkin, 1970: 53).

These pronouncements lead to the hypothesis that, although greater inequality in a society results in a general move to the left, this move is limited by mobility. The more mobility between classes in a society, the more the voting pattern of different classes resemble one another, and the lower the total percentage of left-wing voters will be. This article is concerned with the relationship between social mobility and the total percentage of left wing voters (electoral outcome) in the Netherlands. That this hypothesis does not need to hold for every country, may appear from Parkin's remark that in some industrial societies the number of downwardly mobile persons surpasses the number of upwardly mobile persons (Parkin, 1970: 53). For instance, if some part of a society's population has been downwardly mobile, while no person has been upwardly mobile, and if Parkin's hypothesis holds that downwardly mobile persons stick to the voting behaviour of their class of origin, then in such a situation the percentage of right wing voters in the lower classes will be higher than in a situation of no mobility, although the amount of right wing voters as a percentage of the total population remains the same.

The hypothesis that mobility results in a shift to the right in the political outcome and the above mentioned hypotheses of Sombart, Dahrendorf, Lenski and Parkin are typically macrohypotheses. At first sight this implies that for a test of these hypotheses it would be necessary to conduct comparative research involving a large number of countries. This, however, is costly and time consuming. Yet, macrohypotheses may at times also be deduced from microhypotheses. In this manner it is still possible to test the aggregate hypotheses by means of a less costly and faster way, e.g. by using the underlying individual hypotheses. Such microhypotheses on mobility and voting have been frequently tested in the literature.

The macrohypothesis stating that mobility results in a general shift to the right, may be deduced from several different individual hypotheses. In addition, macrodeductions sometimes require auxiliary assumptions. It is not coincidental that a more recent study by Andeweg on electoral change not only determines the relationship between mobility of individuals and their voting behaviour for different years, but also states how many persons in these years were upwardly mobile and how many downwardly mobile (Andeweg, 1982: 95–103). In fact, one of the first sociological studies determining the amount of social mobility in several industrial societies, dealt with the question of why there is no socialism in the United States (Lipset and Bendix, 1959). As already suggested, it is quite possible that statements about rates of upward or downward mobility are among the auxiliary assumptions necessary for making macrolevel inferences on shifts to the left or right in the political outcome from individual hypotheses on mobility and voting behaviour. Therefore, it is advisable to spell out these individual hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions before testing microhypotheses and before making macroinferences.

Individual Hypotheses and Auxiliary Assumptions

The first hypothesis holds that upwardly mobile persons immediately become equally as right wing as persons immobile in the class of destination of these upwardly mobile persons. Suppose that three classes are distinguished and that persons immobile in the lowest class have a probability of 0.2 of casting a vote for the right, persons immobile in the middle class have a chance of 0.5, and persons immobile in the upper class one of 0.8. According to this hypothesis, someone moving up from the lower to the upper class would have a right wing voting probability of 0.8, as would a person upwardly mobile from the middle to the upper class. A person moving from the lower to the middle class, has a 0.5 chance of casting a vote for the right.

A shortcoming of this hypothesis is that it only pertains to upwardly mobile persons. One of the current explanations of this hypothesis is that upward mobile persons vote for the right because of their new economic interests. When retaining this explanation, it becomes possible to complete the hypothesis on upwardly mobile persons by linking it to a hypothesis on downwardly mobile persons. The latter hypothesis states that persons moving downward immediately become as leftist as persons immobile in the class of destination of these downwardly mobile persons. In the above mentioned example someone moving downward from the upper to the lower class has a chance of 0.2 to cast a vote for right wing parties, as would someone moving down from the middle to the lower class. Someone moving down from the upper to the middle class, will cast a right wing vote with a probability of 0.5. No strict definition of 'economic interest' is required for this argument.

However, when the individual hypothesis on the immediate consequence of economic self-interest is accepted, and one wants to draw the macroinference that mobility results in a move to the right, quite specific assumptions are needed about the marginals of a mobility table. To bring out these assumptions a digression is necessary on the difference between different aspects of a society's mobility table, for example, between total mobility, competitive balance and social fluidity. It is to be noted that the distinction between social fluidity (cf. Erikson *et al.*, 1983) and competitive balance (cf. Ultee and Luijkx, 1986: 194) is akin to and an improvement on the older and, within sociology, still current distinction between structural and circulation mobility (cf. Heath, 1981: 255–7). We will now elaborate on this distinction between total mobility, social fluidity and competitive balance.

One of the striking features of mobility tables is that marginals for parents' class are not identical to marginals for child's class. Usually less children belong to the lower classes than their parents. Table 1a is a self-devised mobility table with identical marginals and without any mobility. In Tables 1b and 1c marginals show less lower class children than lower class origins. Now if one is willing to regard these marginals as exogenously determined, one might say that in societies described by Tables 1b and 1c 'the structure of opportunities' or 'the competitive balance' is more favourable than in societies described by Table 1a. (If the number of lower class destinations is higher than the number of lower class origins, the structure of opportunities or the competitive balance of a society may be classified *un*favourable). Any competitive imbalance, however, necessitates some persons to

TABLE 1. Father's occupation versus son's occupation; without mobility (1.a), only with mobility induced by competitive imbalance (1.b), and with both social fluidity and mobility induced by competitive imbalance (1.c)

		Son											
		1.a				1.b				1.c			
		Low		High		Low		High		Low		High	
	L	50	0	0	50	40	0	10	50	30	10	10	50
Father		0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	10	30	10	50
	H	0	0	50	50	0	0	50	50	0	10	40	50
		50	50	50	150	40	50	60	150	40	50	60	150

be off the main diagonal in a mobility table. A favourable structure of opportunities logically induces some upward mobility (an unfavourable one downward mobility). Given the marginals of Table 1b, it is impossible to assign frequencies to cells in such a way that a society without mobility is obtained. In Table 1b all mobility is necessitated by structural imbalance.

The majority of mobility tables display more mobility than induced by competitive imbalances. Despite their identical opportunity structures, Table 1c shows more mobility than Table 1b. That is, in a society described by Table 1c, part of all actual mobility has causes other than a favourable opportunity structure. It may, for example, have been caused by the value climate of a society favouring openness of classes, which is a popular topic among sociologists. To distinguish this part of 'total mobility' from mobility necessitated by competitive imbalances, it might be denominated as 'social fluidity'.

After this digression on the distinction between total mobility, competitive balance and social fluidity, it is possible to return to the auxiliary assumptions required for deducing macro-predictions on a society's political outcome from individual hypotheses about economic self-interest which we mentioned earlier. We contend that, given these hypotheses, a society's competitive balance does and a society's social fluidity does not affect this society's political outcome, and that more mobility is not necessarily accompanied by a shift to the right.

That social fluidity, given a fixed competitive imbalance and individual assumptions about economic self-interest, does not influence a country's political outcome, may be illustrated with the help of Tables 1a, 1b and 1c. According to Table 1a and the previously mentioned probabilities of left wing voting by persons immobile in different classes, the percentage of the population casting a right wing vote is:

$$(0.2*50 + 0.5*50 + 0.8*50)/150 = 50\%$$

According to Table 1b this percentage is:

$$(0.2*40 + 0.5*50 + (0.8*(10 + 50))/150 = 54\%$$

And according to Table 1c it is:

$$(0.2*(30 + 10) + 0.5*(10 + 30 + 10) + 0.8*(10 + 10 + 40))/150 = 54\%$$

The second percentage is identical to the third one. Some playing around with other self-devised tables without any social fluidity shows that as a society's

competitive balance becomes more and more (un)favourable, this society's political outcome moves more and more towards the right (left). The results of these examples may be restated in more general terms. If the individual hypothesis about economic self-interest and immediate adjustment is true, a society's political outcome is not influenced by its total mobility nor by its social fluidity. A country's political outcome is influenced only by its competitive imbalance or opportunity structure.

This conclusion implies a qualification of the macrohypothesis, stated earlier in this paper, holding that mobility always results in a shift towards the right. To the extent that a society's competitive balance is favourable, a society's political outcome indeed moves towards the right. However, to the extent that a society's opportunity structure is unfavourable, this society's political outcome swings to the left. If a society's fluidity increases while the opportunity structure does not change, this society's political outcome will not change. Whichever assumption about opportunity structures and social fluidity in a society under investigation in actual fact holds true, is an attendant, yet by no means subordinate, empirical issue. It is important to note Marx's prediction that under unrestrained capitalism the middle class will disappear and that the class of capitalists will shrink, is closely akin to the auxiliary assumption that competitive balances will become more unfavourable.[1]

The above-mentioned individual hypothesis supposes that the voting behaviour of upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals is immediately adapted to that of the class of destination. A second possible individual hypothesis also assumes economic self-interest, but does not postulate a quick adjustment. In this hypothesis an individual's voting behaviour is seen as partially being the result of habit, and to outgrow a habit takes time. As a first approximation, the importance of habituation is supposed to be identical for upwardly and downwardly mobile persons. This may be indicated by means of a weight-factor a ($0 \leq a \leq 1$). On the basis of the previously mentioned percentages of right wing votes for persons immobile in various classes, persons upwardly mobile from the lower to the middle class will vote for the right at a rate of $(a*20 + (1 - a)*50)\%$, and persons downwardly mobile from the middle class to the lower class at a rate of $((1 - a)*20 + a*50)\%$. For other cases of mobility, readers may easily calculate percentages of right wing votes. It is obvious that the first individual hypothesis of immediate adjustment is a special case of this second hypothesis. For the first hypothesis the a of the second hypothesis equals zero.

Considering the second hypothesis, self-devised tables again show that only mobility necessitated by competitive imbalance results in a shift of a society's political outcome, and that social fluidity does not. To the extent that competitive imbalances force upward mobility, a country's political outcome moves to the right; and to the extent these imbalances necessitate downward mobility, it moves to the left.

The first and second individual hypotheses assume that only economic self-interest guides a person's voting behaviour. In the literature, however, hypotheses referring to a different individual objective exist. In this way a third hypothesis assumes that a status motive (Lipset, 1960: 240 and 267–72), or pursuit of a favourable self-image (Parkin, 1970: 51, 54) is the ultimate aim determining voting behaviour. In this line of argument, upwardly mobile persons—in order to display their newly attained higher status— will cast a right wing vote to the same extent as do other members of the class into which they have climbed. This status-based

prediction for upwardly mobile persons is identical to that obtained by a hypothesis of economic self-interest. An identity, however, does not hold for downwardly mobile persons. According to the status hypothesis, people are seeking a positive self-image. This supposition implies that downwardly mobile persons are reluctant to admit that they have moved down on the social ladder. Therefore, downwardly mobile persons will continue to support the right wing to the same extent as persons remaining in the class of origin of these downwardly mobile persons. This is a prediction contrary to the one made by the hypothesis on economic self-interest. When applying the same figures we would find persons upwardly mobile from the lower to the middle class voting for the right with a probability of 0.5, and persons downwardly mobile from the middle to the lower class doing the same.

The contrast between hypothesis 1 and 3 may be summed up by Tables 2a and 2b. Hypothesis 3 postulates, statistically speaking, an interaction effect (of origin and destination on voting behaviour). Hypothesis 1 only asserts an influence of destination and not an effect of origin.

TABLE 2. Son's political preference cross-classified by father's occupation and son's occupation; according to an economic hypothesis holding that mobile persons adjust immediately to the preference of those immobile in the son's category of destination (2.a); and according to a status hypothesis holding that upwardly mobile immediately adapt to the preference of those immobile in the son's category of destination and that downwardly mobile permanently hang on to the preference of those immobile in the son's category of origin (2.b)

		Son					
		2.a			2.b		
		Low		High	Low		High
		%	%	%	%	%	%
Father	Low	20	50	80	20	50	80
		20	50	80	50	50	80
	High	20	50	80	80	80	80

In order to deduce from this individual hypothesis on status motives the macrohypothesis that mobility leads to a shift to the right in a society's political outcome, no auxiliary assumptions are required about competitive imbalances. The more mobility between a society's classes—whether in an upward or downward direction—the higher the percentage of the population voting for the right. There is no need to construct tables to make this clear. This means that if hypothesis 3 is empirically tenable, in order to obtain macro-effects an auxiliary assumption about the total amount of mobility in a society is necessary . If hypothesis 1 is supported, an auxiliary assumption on opportunity structures will be sufficient to determine the political consequences of mobility on a collective level.

A fourth individual hypothesis is now obvious: a hypothesis on status motives which abandons the supposition that upward mobility is immediately accepted and that downward mobility is permanently denied. As a first approximation, the ease with which individuals accept upward mobility is supposed to correspond with the

ease of denying downward mobility. This dexterity may be represented by a weight-factor b ($0 \leq b \leq 1$). In the above example $((1 - b)*20 + b*50)\%$ of the persons upwardly mobile from the lower to the middle class will cast a right wing vote. In addition, of all persons downwardly mobile from the middle class to the lower class, $((1 - b)*20 + b*50)\%$ will cast a right wing vote. The third hypothesis is a special case of the fourth one ($b = 1$).

With regard to this fourth hypothesis no auxiliary assumption about a society's competitive imbalance is necessary in order to deduce the macro-hypothesis that mobility results in a shift to the right of a country's political outcome. Again, an assumption about total mobility will suffice. Furthermore, if hypothesis 3 or 4 results in a better approximation of data than hypothesis 1 or 2, the macro-effect depends on a society's total amount of mobility—if hypothesis 1 or 2 provides a better approximation, aggregate effects depend upon a society's opportunity structure. Notice that the fourth hypothesis predicts that upwardly mobile persons are more likely to become right wing voters than downwardly mobile persons are to become left wing voters. This hypothesis has been advanced several times without making its derivation explicit (Stacey, 1966: 133; Abrahamson, 1972: 1292).

The difference between hypotheses 2 and 4 is shown in Table 3. In this table a and b have been given the value 0.8. Note that hypothesis 4 predicts an interaction effect, and that according to hypothesis 2 the effect of origin and destination on voting behaviour is solely additive. Early studies on mobility and voting behaviour estimating additive and interaction effects are Jackman (1972: 214) and Knoke (1973: 1450–1).

TABLE 3. Son's political preference cross-classified by father's occupation and son's occupation: according to an economic hypothesis specifying a certain time lag (3.a), and according to a status hypothesis with gradual adjustments (3.b)

		Son					
		3.a			3.b		
		Low		High	Low		High
		%	%	%	%	%	%
Father	Low	20	44	68	20	44	68
		26	50	74	44	50	74
	High	32	56	80	68	74	80

Naturally, it is also possible to state an individual hypothesis where downward mobility is as easily accepted as upward mobility. Since such a hypothesis disregards the former mentioned hypothesis of status motives, we do not consider it very interesting. This hypothesis predicts the same outcome for upward mobile persons as do the second and fourth hypotheses. For persons who are downwardly mobile from the middle to the lower class this hypothesis predicts (according to the above numerical example) that $(b*20 + (1 - b)* 50)\%$ of these persons will cast a right wing vote. Consequently, it leads to the same predictions as the second hypothesis and, because of this, is omitted in this article.

Research Questions

Given these individual hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions, the research section of this article is divided into three parts. The first part poses the question of to what extent specific auxiliary assumptions[2] hold for the Netherlands in the 1970s. Assumptions about the total amount of mobility and about the extent of competitive imbalance are necessary for deducing from individual hypotheses the macrohypothesis that mobility causes a shift to the right in a country's political outcome. In the second part we ask which of the first four individual hypotheses mentioned above gives the best approximation on voting for Dutch data from the 1970s. In the third part, the microhypothesis providing the closest empirical approximation is linked with the auxiliary assumptions on a country's total mobility or the adhering competitive balance, which is necessary for deducing a macrostatement about mobility and shift in political outcome.

We contend that the relevance of this first, more sociological question has been insufficiently acknowledged in political science research. For instance, a recent study by the Dutch political scientist Andeweg presents percentages of upwardly and downwardly mobile persons (Andeweg, 1982; 97), but makes no distinction between total mobility, competitive balance and social fluidity (or any other distinction close to it). By failing to do this, Andeweg implicitly follows the way paved by US sociologists Lipset and Bendix (1959), as their study on mobility and the strength of socialism only computed the percentage of a country's population having experienced social mobility. In a recent and well-known study of the British sociologist Heath (1981: 235) a distinction was made similar to the one elaborated here, but it was not concerned with the possible divergent influence of total mobility and competitive balance on a society's political outcome. Therefore, in this article a simple[3] analysis of mobility tables from the point of view of total mobility and competitive balance precedes a test of individual hypotheses on mobility and voting behaviour. For the same reason, findings on auxiliary assumptions about total mobility or competitive balances and on individual hypotheses are linked together in a separate section.

Older Research Findings and Technical Difficulties

Data on mobility and voting behaviour pertinent to the individual hypotheses discussed in the preceding paragraph, have been collected in many countries in the past. We discuss this body of research from the point of view of technical difficulties arising in data analysis, before moving on to the main analysis.

Lipset and Zetterberg analysed data on West Germany, Finland and the United States about a decade after World War II. According to US data, people who moved upwards from the blue collar to the middle class turned out to be more conservative than those belonging to the middle class since their birth. It appeared that in Finland and West Germany upwardly mobile persons tended to be more leftist than those belonging to the middle class since childhood. According to Lipset and Zetterberg downwardly mobile persons showed the same behaviour in every country. These individuals voted more conservative than those who had belonged to the blue collar class all their life (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956). Later on Lipset and Bendix obtained the same conclusions for Norway and Sweden as well as for Finland and Germany (1959: 66–72).

Referring to hypotheses discussed earlier on in this paper, it should be noted that the findings of these authors, obtained by making percentages of table frequencies, are not exact enough for a test of these hypotheses. One cannot decide between hypotheses 2 and 4, between a hypothesis specifying additive effects and one which specifies interaction effects. However, the findings of Lipset and Zetterberg do indicate that hypothesis 3, on status motives, may have been formulated too weakly: in the case of upward mobility there could be over-conformity (cf. Knoke, 1973: 1451).

This remark on the precision of findings still appears relevant a decade later. In a state of the art study, Barber reviewed the hypothesis that 'for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile, political loyalties and attitudes tend to change in the directions appropriate to their new status, resulting in political behaviour intermediate between that of their old status and that of their new status' (Barber, 1970: 36). After discussing available data for the United States, Barber drew the conclusion that this hypothesis does best represent the behaviour of both upwardly and downwardly mobile persons. Because of Barber's research a hypothesis on over-identification seems a thing of the past. However, the expression 'intermediate' is not exact enough to distinguish between economic and status motives, between additive and interaction effects.

In the early 1970s Abramson found that for Great Britain 'upwardly mobile respondents were more likely to support the Conservative Party than downwardly mobile were to support Labour' (Abramson, 1972: 1292). Heath arrived at an identical conclusion based on new data for Great Britain almost ten years later: 'The Labour lead among the blue-collar sons of Class I fathers is much smaller than the Conservative lead among Class I sons of blue-collar fathers' (Heath, 1981: 234–5). Class I is the highest class in Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero's class scheme, which is often used in comparative mobility research (1983).

The findings of Abramson and Heath are stated in more exact terms than findings reviewed earlier in this section. Closer examination, however, shows that the findings are not accurate enough to decide between the hypotheses presented in this paper. These hypotheses not only compare voting behaviour of upwardly mobile with that of downwardly mobile, but voting behaviour of both high-level and low-level immobile persons as well. In order to test hypothesis 3, downwardly and upwardly mobile persons must be compared with the same category of immobile persons, that is, with high-level immobile persons. This is different, however, for hypothesis 1. When testing the latter hypothesis, upwardly mobile persons are to be compared with high-level immobile persons and downwardly mobile persons with low-level immobile persons. With regard to hypotheses 2 and 4, for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile, both categories of immobile persons have to be taken into consideration, and according to the numerical examples presented for these hypotheses these categories are to be considered differently.

Compared to other countries little empirical research on mobility and voting behaviour has been done for the Netherlands. Andeweg recently constructed a table cross-classifying voting behaviour and mobility, the mobility variable consisting of the categories upwardly mobile, immobile and downwardly mobile (Andeweg, 1982: 99, Table 3.11). This table shows that upwardly mobile persons have a higher probability of voting VVD (the main right-wing party) than immobile, and the downwardly mobile show a lower probability. Andeweg then constructed a table

to connect mobility and voting, controlling for the respondent's social class (Table 3.12). This table led to the conclusion that downwardly mobile persons vote VVD to a greater extent, a finding which Andeweg eventually accepted.

Apparently all immobile persons should not be massed together into one category, as Andeweg did in the first mentioned table. Certain difficulties might be solved by a table in which voting, class of destination and mobility are cross-classified. However, this brings about a new difficulty. The variables 'class of destination' and 'mobility' are logically related and it is well-known that such matters are to be avoided (see Blau and Duncan, 1967: 194–9 with examples from the field of social mobility). It is not clear why Andeweg offers no table cross-classifying the respondent's voting, respondent's own class and class of father. Problems with both Andeweg's first and second table are avoided with the help of this table. Additionally, this table is frequently presented in the literature (see Abramson, 1972; Thorburn, 1979; Heath, 1981). A 'workbook' on social mobility also regresses the respondent's vote for a party on present class and social mobility (Herz, 1986: 140) without noting its doubtfulness.

All studies reviewed so far looked at percentages with a naked eye. Doing so, it is difficult to distinguish additive from interaction effects. A more formalised type of analysis, originally employed by Duncan to determine effects of mobility on fertility (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 361–99), was used by Jackman (1972). This is a linear regression analysis, where voting behaviour is the variable to be explained, while origin, destination and a term for interaction between origin and destination are explanatory variables. Knoke (1973) applied multiple-classification analysis, another technique used by Duncan in research on stratification and mobility (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 128–40). Before Jackman and Knoke applied them, these techniques had already been criticized by Hope (1971). Hope's main argument is that they model (procreation, voting) behaviour of mobile persons as being dependent on marginal frequencies, while this behaviour should be a function of main diagonal frequencies. In hypotheses about the voting behaviour of mobile persons comparisons between immobile persons (main diagonal cells) are made and class averages are not compared (marginal cells). These hypotheses postulate substantively quite specific additive and interaction effects, effects theoretically different from those in Duncan's original models.

Hope proposed so-called diamond models as a better alternative. Thorburn employed these in research on mobility and voting behaviour (1979). Sobel (1981) in his turn criticized Hope's diamond model. Sobel reveals that its parametrization does not fulfil Hope's contention that effects should be parametrized with respect to the main diagonal cells of a mobility table (Sobel, 1981: 895). Accepting Hope's contention, Sobel came up with a new parametrization, embodied in a so-called diagonal model (a specific type of non-linear regression). This model, according to Sobel, does allow for a specification of additive and interaction effects required on substantive grounds. No technical criticism of diagonal models has been published. It might be noted that although Thompson (1971) did not present a full formalization, Thompson—at this early date—quite clearly stated that voting behaviour of mobile persons is to be compared with voting behaviour of persons immobile in specific categories of the main diagonal. In fact, Thompson sought to implement this observation in an analysis of tables cross-classifying voting behaviour, respondent's class and father's class for five different nations.

An example might help the reader to understand the substantial difference

between the diagonal mobility model on the one hand and the multiple classification model, also known as the square additive model, on the other. Imagine a 3×3 table in which son's voting behaviour is cross-classified against his own class and that of his father. In such a case the multiple classification model may be generalized as follows:

		Son's class			
		I	II	III	
	I	$M+f1+s1$	$M+f1+s2$	$M+f1+s3$	$M+f1$
Father's class	II	$M+f2+s1$	$M+f2+s2$	$M+f2+s3$	$M+f2$
	III	$M+f3+s1$	$M+f3+s2$	$M+f3+s3$	$M+f3$
		$M+s1$	$M+s2$	$M+s3$	

Where the voting score of the k^{th} individual (Y_{ijk}) is a function of destination (s_i), origin (f_j) and an overall effect M. In contrast to this model Sobel's base line model for such a table can be visualized as follows:

		Son's class		
		I	II	III
	I	u	$r.v + p.u$	$r.w + p.u$
Father's class	II	$r.u + p.v$	v	$r.w + p.v$
	III	$r.u + p.w$	$r.v + p.w$	w

where u, v and w are parameters for the main effects with respect to the diagonal population means of voting behaviour. The off diagonal cells are defined as a function of the diagonal by parameter weights p and r. (In a later paragraph we will give a mathematical description of this model.)

The first conclusion of this review of difficulties in data analysis is, that in order to test the individual hypotheses on mobility and voting behaviour outlined in the preceding paragraph, tables must be analysed in which voting behaviour is cross-classified by class of origin and class of destination. The second conclusion is that those tables should not be analysed by looking at percentages with a naked eye, but by a more formalized technique of data analysis. Third, substantively specific additive effects in these tables are to be distinguished from theoretically distinct interaction effects. To fulfil these conditions for further research, this paper uses Sobel's diagonal mobility models.

Data and Construction of Variables

Data for testing hypotheses outlined above, have been taken from the Dutch Election Surveys 'Verkiezingsonderzoek 1970–1973' (Steinmetzarchive. nr. P0136) and the 'Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 1977' (Steinmetzarchive nr. P0354). From the first we selected the 1970 and the 1971 surveys. Surveys are referred to as KIES70, KIES71 and KIES77. All surveys represent the Dutch population. Using questionnaires, male and female respondents were asked about actual voting behaviour (or voting intention), father's occupation, and own occupation (housewives were asked for husband's occupation). KIES70 numbered 1839, KIES71 960 and KIES77 1856 respondents. These three surveys were merged in order to obtain a reasonable number of cases in the categories which contain the most extreme mobile persons (total 4655 cases).

Male respondents 21 years and older were selected from the surveys of 1970 and

1971. From the survey of 1977 male respondents 18 years and older were selected. The reason for making different selections, is that in 1977 the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 years. In order to determine social mobility for female respondents, Andeweg cross-classified the occupation of the father of female respondents against their husband's occupation. It cannot be decided at this stage to what extent this choice is unfortunate. It seemed more prudent to confine the analysis to men only. This decision reduced the number of cases by half. Finally, there were more missing values in KIES77 than in KIES70 and KIES71. The probable cause lies in the wording of the questions involved. In 1970/71 the percentage of missing observations was 20, in 1977 it was 27. The final result is that of the original 4655 cases 1585 are suitable for our analysis.

Measurement of Independent Variables

In the three questionnaires occupational titles of sons and fathers were coded according to the CBS four digit classification of occupations. These codes have been recorded into Van Tulder's (1962) occupational prestige scale counting six categories.[4] Andeweg's scale, which consists of five economic classes, might have been an alternative for this occupational prestige scale. We consider that when hypotheses on status motives, using occupational titles coded according to occupational prestige, do not pass empirical tests, this is more telling than when these hypotheses do not pass tests when occupational titles merged into economic classes are used. By choosing Van Tulder's occupational prestige scale, closer relations are also established with research on social mobility in the Netherlands (Ganzeboom and de Graaf, 1984). If a classification of occupational titles into economic classes is to be used, it is worthwhile to link up with international developments by employing the classification of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarcro (1983). A disadvantage of EGP's class scheme is that these economic classes do not form one ranking order.[5] For this reason it is difficult to regard forms of mobility as upward or downward. Therefore, Van Tulder's occupational prestige scale was chosen.

Van Tulder's scale consists of the following six categories (given in reverse order):

VI. Mainly learned professions, managing directors of large firms, secondary school teachers, highest-ranking civil servants.
V. Mainly higher-level employees, managing directors of small firms, high-level civil servants, large farmers and market-gardeners, intermediate technicians.
IV. Mainly large shopkeepers, middle-level employees, middle-sized farmers and market-gardeners, middle-level civil servants and employees.
III. Mainly small shopkeepers; skilled labourers, small farmers and market-gardeners, lower-level civil servants and employees.
II. Mainly semi-skilled labourers, subordinate service personnel.
I. Mainly unskilled labourers.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable

Several problems arose in measuring the dependent variable. First, all three available surveys do not provide identical indicators. In KIES70 and KIES71, respondents

were asked which party they would vote for if there were Second Chamber elections. In KIES77 respondents were asked how they actually voted in the last Second Chamber elections.

In earlier sections of this article, the dependent variable of the individual hypothesis to be tested, was indicated rather unrefined as voting behaviour. In this respect it is important to note that the background of the hypothesis to be tested, does not give cause for the assumption that mobility divergently does effect actual voting behaviour and voting intention. This implies that employment of somewhat different measures is not objectionable beforehand.

A second difficulty with the dependent variable is typically Dutch. British and US political scientists have been able to assume the existence of two political parties, while analysing data for their countries. This simplifies analysis to a high extent. For the Netherlands, a country with a multi-party system, an analogous analysis might be ventured based on percentages of VVD-voters (the main right wing party) or percentages of PvdA-voters (the main left wing party), but this would leave out too many parties and votes. Therefore, various Dutch political parties have been given a score on a seven-points left–right scale. These scores were taken from specific empirical research, indicating which idea people have of political parties (van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983: 249). For rescoring political party preferences from the 1970 and 1971 surveys, party-scores from 1974 were chosen (these scores were nearest in time); for recoding 1977 voting behaviour, party-scores from 1976 were used. The positions of the various political parties on these seven-point scales are given in Table 4. Scores do not differ much from year to year. No data are available in all three surveys on left–right scores, which persons ascribe to themselves.

A third difficulty concerns the mergers between parties. Data on voting behaviour in the surveys of 1970 and 1971 refer to the three main Christian parties separately and have been recorded to left–right scores accordingly. On the other hand, the 1977 data refer to the CDA party, the combination of the three main Christian parties.

TABLE 4. Positions of various Dutch political parties on a seven-point left–right scale (the higher the score, the more right wing the party is) in 1974 and 1976

Political party	November 1974	February 1976
CPN	1.62	1.58
PSP	2.49	2.21
PvdA	2.46	2.28
PPR	2.74	2.50
D'66	3.18	3.29
DS'70	4.01	3.93
BP	4.99	5.01
KVP	4.90	4.90
ARP	5.12	4.97
CHU	5.52	5.52
CDA	4.84	4.99
VVD	5.05	5.31
GPV	6.00	6.17
SGP	5.93	6.05

The main table to be analysed in this paper presents average voting for each combination of origin and destination with help of the above-mentioned left–right scale (Table 5). Absolute numbers in brackets of this three-dimensional table refer to frequencies of a two-dimensional table cross-classifying occupational prestige of fathers and sons. These numbers in brackets, and their correspondig marginals, form classical mobility tables and will first be analysed in order to determine tenability of auxiliary assumptions on mobility patterns.

TABLE 5. Average political preference on a seven-points left–right scale, cross-classified by son's occupational prestige and father's occupational prestige.*

		Occupational prestige of son							
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI		%
Low	I	2.227	3.249	3.151	3.680	3.483	–	3.144	
		(6)	(21)	(29)	(2)	(6)	(0)	(64)	4.0
	II	3.865	3.786	3.945	3.758	3.996	4.146	3.876	
Occupational		(31)	(165)	(180)	(52)	(41)	(14)	(483)	30.5
prestige	III	4.024	3.875	3.895	4.240	4.096	4.355	3.997	
of father		(22)	(111)	(267)	(88)	(63)	(35)	(586)	37.0
	IV	3.467	4.169	4.303	4.528	4.456	4.684	4.385	
		(6)	(35)	(78)	(54)	(28)	(33)	(234)	14.8
	V	2.460	4.011	3.751	4.560	4.581	4.514	4.267	
		(1)	(12)	(37)	(21)	(37)	(25)	(133)	8.4
High	VI	4.900	3.468	4.343	4.665	4.662	4.068	3.885	
		(1)	(4)	(16)	(19)	(23)	(22)	(85)	5.4
		3.729	3.825	3.858	4.258	4.264	4.389	4.000	
	N	(67)	(348)	(607)	(236)	(198)	(129)	(1585)	
	%	4.2	22.0	38.3	14.9	12.5	8.1		100.0

*Number of cases in brackets. The higher a score for voting, the more rightist this vote.

Results

Results for Mobility Patterns

First, we determine whether the Netherlands has more upwardly or more downwardly mobile persons. An answer is given in Table 6 (containing data from Table 5). It turns out that there are considerably more upwardly mobile than downwardly mobile individuals.

Auxiliary assumptions necessary for determining aggregate effects of individual hypotheses 3 and 4, pertain to the number of mobile persons as a percentage of the total population, that is to say, to the percentage of upwardly mobile persons plus the percentage of downwardly mobile persons. The total percentage of mobile persons reaches 65.2 per cent.

For the macroapplication of individual hypotheses 1 and 2, the auxiliary assumptions on the (un)favourableness of opportunity structures or competitive balances are required. In order to determine this unfavourableness, marginal frequencies of occupational prestige for fathers and sons may be compared (see Table 5). It is clear that the distribution of occupational prestige scores for fathers is dissimilar to the one for sons. Hence, there are competitive imbalances.

Computation of an 'index of dissimilarity' (the sum of the absolute percentage differences between similar categories from marginal frequencies for fathers and sons, cf. Blau and Duncan, 1967: 43) results in a value of 16.9. Competitive imbalances largely amount to forced upward mobility. Along with mobility induced by opportunity structures, there is social fluidity. The index of dissimilarity stands for twice the minimum percentage of mobile persons, whereas the actual percentage of mobile persons is higher. At least 8.4 per cent of all persons should be mobile, whereas the actual percentage of mobile persons is 65.2.

TABLE 6. Immobile, upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile and mobile male respondents (%)

	N	%
Immobile	551	34.8
Upwardly mobile	617	38.9
Downwardly mobile	417	26.3
All mobile	1034	65.2

Concerning the dependent variable Table 6 indicates that in general people are more right wing, when their status is higher. The main diagonal shows that people immobile in a higher status group, are more right wing than persons immobile in lower status groups. There is, however, an exception. Category VI of the immobile persons represents a low-flyer.

Diagonal Models

(a) Modelling Economic Hypotheses

Sobel's most strict diagonal model gives an exact representation of the economic hypothesis specifying gradual adjustment. This model, also called additive base-line model, is specified as follows:[6]

$$y_{ijk} = u_{ij} + E_{ijk} \tag{1}$$

$$u_{ij} = p.u_{ii} + r.u_{jj} \tag{2}$$

(a) $i = 1,2,3,4,5,6.$; $j = 1,2,3,4,5,6.$; $k = 1,\ldots,n_{ij}$;

(b) $p + r = 1$

(c) $0 \leq p \leq 1.$

In these formulas, y_{ijk} is the value of the dependent variable where there are k observations for the cell ij of a mobility table. Subscript i stands for status of origin and j for status of destination. The expression u_{ij} indicates population averages of the dependent variable for observations in cell ij of this mobility table. E_{ijk} is a stochastic term with 0 as expected value. Expressions u_{ii} and u_{jj} are population averages in cell ii (the diagonal cell for the origin reference) and cell jj (the diagonal cell for the destination reference) of this mobility table.

In this model the reference value for immobile persons is u_{ii}. For persons off the main diagonal, this model has two reference values. The first is the diagonal estimate of the 'son' category weighted by r and the second one is the diagonal estimate of the 'father' category weighted by p. Restriction b allows for stating parameter p in terms of r ($p = 1 - r$). Restriction c implies that origin and destination are compared as comparable chances. A consequence of this restriction is an estimate of the influence of origin relative to that of destination. Parameter u_{ij} thus is a weighted average of two reference values affecting the left–right score of an individual. Parameter p indicates the influence of origin in proportion to the effect of destination. As $r = 1 - p$, r indicates the influence of destination in proportion to that of origin. The similarity between what we have explained informally by means of a simple example, and what is now formalized here, is clear.

This additive base-line model enables a test of hypothesis 2. This may be illustrated by representing hypothesis 2 in tabular form (Table 7). In this table, specific types of immobile persons have an average left–right score of u, v, w, x, y, z. That is, u, v, w, x, y and z should be read as u_{11}, u_{22}, u_{33}, u_{44}, u_{55} and u_{66} of equation 2.

TABLE 7. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporating an economic hypothesis specifying a gradual adaptation of mobile persons to persons immobile in mobiles' destination category

			Son (r)					
			I	II	III	IV	V	VI
F		I	u	$r.v+p.u$	$r.w+p.u$	$r.x+p.u$	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.u$
a		II	$r.u+p.v$	v	$r.w+p.v$	$r.x+p.v$	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.v$
t	(p)	III	$r.u+p.w$	$r.v.+p.w$	w	$r.x+p.w$	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.w$
h		IV	$r.u+p.x$	$r.v+p.x$	$r.w+p.x$	x	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.x$
e		V	$r.u+p.y$	$r.v+p.y$	$r.w+p.y$	$r.x+p.y$	y	$r.z+p.y$
r		VI	$r.u+p.z$	$r.v+p.z$	$r.w+p.z$	$r.x+p.z$	$r.y+p.z$	z

TABLE 8. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporating an economic hypothesis specifying an immediate adjustment of mobile persons to persons immobile in mobiles' destination category

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
I	u	v	w	x	y	z
II	u	v	w	x	y	z
III	u	v	w	x	y	z
IV	u	v	w	x	y	z
V	u	v	w	x	y	z
VI	u	v	w	x	y	z

In Table 8 parameter $p = 0$ and parameter $r = 1$. This represents hypothesis 1, the economic hypothesis about immediate adjustment. In formularly form, this hypothesis reads as follows:

$$y_{ijk} = u_{ij} + E_{ijk}; \tag{1}$$

$$u_{ij} = u_{jj} \tag{3}$$

It should be noticed that this equation 3 is a special case of equation 2, that is to say, $p = 0$.

Parameter estimates of the model with immediate adjustment are shown in Table 9. By means of this model, both average scores (for example average voting behaviour) and data on an individual level may be included. In this paper the latter method is chosen for every model (this choice does not affect results). Parameter estimates of the model with gradual adjustment are shown in Table 9 as well. According to hypothesis 2, the additive base-line model should have a $\hat{p} \neq 0$, or at least p should differ significantly from 0. In Table 9 $\hat{p}$ comes to 0.66 (se = 0.8).

TABLE 9. Parameter estimates, degrees of freedom and Residual Mean Square of models for political preference according to an economic hypothesis specifying immediate adjustment (col 1); and according to an economic hypothesis specifying gradual adjustment (col 2)

Parameter	I	II
$\hat{p}$		0.66 (0.08)
$\hat{u}_{11}$	3.73 (0.16)	2.93 (0.21)
$\hat{u}_{22}$	3.82 (0.07)	3.81 (0.07)
$\hat{u}_{33}$	3.93 (0.05)	3.95 (0.06)
$\hat{u}_{44}$	4.26 (0.08)	4.51 (0.11)
$\hat{u}_{55}$	4.26 (0.09)	4.36 (0.13)
$\hat{u}_{66}$	4.40 (0.11)	4.51 (0.17)
df	1579	1578
RMS	1.69008	1.65012

This means, in the first place, that $\hat{p}$ significantly deviates from 0. Second, we observe that the effect of origin is more important than the effect of destination, since $\hat{r} = 0.34$ versus $\hat{p} = 0.66$.[7] This finding for the Netherlands is in contrast with the finding of Abramson (1972) for Britain, Abramson found a stronger impact of destination.

In order to compare the model for hypothesis 2 to the model for hypothesis 1, a standard likelihood ratio test is applied. For this comparison we computed the likelihood ratio $L = (r\hat{m}s_f/r\hat{m}s_n)^N$.[8] Considering that $-2(\log L)$ has an asymptotical CHI^2 distribution, where r is the number of additional parameters in the general model, models may be compared. The test shows that hypothesis 1 needs to be rejected, because the baseline model for all tables presents a significant improvement (critical value when $p < 0.05$ for CHI^2 with 1 degree of freedom is 3.8); CHI^2 value with the same degrees of freedom is 75.9.

Summarizing the result on the tenability of the two versions of an economic self-interst hypothesis, hypothesis 2, stating that individuals gradually adjust to their destination category, is the one to be preferred. However, it turned out that there is a strong habituation to origin and a small adaptation to destination.

(b) Models for Status Hypotheses

Just like hypotheses 1 and 2, hypotheses 3 and 4 may be represented in tabular form. According to hypothesis 3, represented in Table 10, $r = 1$ and $p = 0$. This results in the following functions:

$$y_{ijk} = u_{ij} + E_{ijk}; \quad (1)$$

$$u_{ij} = u_{jj}, \text{ if } i < j \quad (4)$$

$$u_{ij} = u_{ii}, \text{ if } i > j \quad (5)$$

TABLE 10. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporating a status hypothesis specifying an immediate adjustment of upwardly mobile to immobile persons in upwardly mobile's destination category and a permanent hanging on of downwardly mobile to immobile persons in downwardly mobile's origin category

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
I	u	v	w	x	y	z
II	v	v	w	x	y	z
III	w	w	w	x	y	z
IV	x	x	x	x	y	z
V	y	y	y	y	y	z
VI	z	z	z	z	z	z

Representing hypothesis 4 is a more complicated matter. Restrictions are the same as for hypothesis 2, i.e. $p + r = 1$ and $0 \leq p \leq 1$, and again various types of immobile persons have an average left–right score of u, v, w, x, y, z. The tabular form of hypothesis 4 is given in Table 11. Notice that, compared with Table 7, only

TABLE 11. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporating a status hypothesis specifying a gradual adjustment of upwardly mobile to persons immobile in upwardly mobile's destination category and a gradual loosening of downwardly mobile from persons immobile in downwardly mobile's origin category

		Son					
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
F	I	u	$r.v+p.u$	$r.w+p.u$	$r.x+p.u$	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.u$
a	II	$p.u+r.v$	v	$r.w+p.v$	$r.x+p.v$	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.v$
t	III	$p.u+r.w$	$p.v+r.w$	w	$r.x+p.w$	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.w$
h	IV	$p.u+r.x$	$p.v+r.x$	$p.w+r.x$	x	$r.y+p.u$	$r.z+p.x$
e	V	$p.u+r.y$	$p.v+r.y$	$p.w+r.y$	$p.x+r.y$	y	$r.z+p.y$
r	VI	$p.u+r.z$	$p.v+r.z$	$p.w+r.z$	$p.x+r.z$	$p.y+r.z$	z

the downwardly mobile persons are given new scores for political preference. This is represented by the following functions:

$$y_{ijk} = u_{ij} + E_{ijk}; \quad (1)$$

$$u_{ij} = p.u_{ii} + r.u_{jj}, \text{ if } i < j \quad (6)$$

$$u_{ij} = r.u_{ii} + p.u_{jj}, \text{ if } i > j \quad (7)$$

Results of fitting this model for hypothesis 4 are given in Table 12. Parameter estimates for the model reflecting hypothesis 3 are given in Table 12 as well.

When computing CHI^2 values for a comparison of models represented in Table

TABLE 12. Parameter estimates, degrees of freedom and Residual mean Square of models for political preference according to a status hypothesis specifying immediate adjustment (col 1); and according to status hypothesis specifying gradual adjustment (col 2)

Parameter	I	II
$\hat{p}$		0.64 (0.11)
$\hat{u}_{11}$	2.23 (0.53)	3.22 (0.20)
$\hat{u}_{22}$	3.75 (0.09)	3.81 (0.07)
$\hat{u}_{33}$	3.88 (0.05)	3.95 (0.07)
$\hat{u}_{44}$	4.20 (0.07)	4.59 (0.12)
$\hat{u}_{55}$	4.16 (0.08)	4.46 (0.15)
$\hat{u}_{66}$	4.43 (0.09)	4.47 (0.20)
df	1579	1578
RMS	1.67199	1.65344

12, the result is: *CHI2* is 35.4 (1 df). This means that hypothesis 4 produces a better approximation than hypothesis 3. With respect to this comparison, hypothesis 4 is preferred.

Finally, it is to be tested whether hypothesis 4 produces a better approximation than hypothesis 2. For this purpose, the Residual Mean Squares of columns II of Table 9 and Table 12 will be directly compared. This is possible, as the degrees of freedom are the same for both models.

It turns out that the weak version of the hypothesis on economic self-interest, postulating a slow adaptation (hypothesis 2), stands out more clearly than the weak version (hypothesis 4) of the status hypothesis.[9]

Conclusions

In this article some current hypotheses have been tested on the influence of intergenerational mobility of individuals on their political preference. Two hypotheses started from economic self-interest of individuals. The first hypothesis assumed an immediate adaptation of the political preference of mobile persons to the political preference of persons immobile in the category mobiles have moved into. The second hypothesis was a weak version of the first and presumed a lower adaptation. An upwardly mobile person will not immediately become as right wing as persons immobile in the category of destination of this upwardly mobile person. Similarly, a downwardly mobile person will not become as leftist as persons immobile in the category of destination of this downwardly mobile person.

In addition, two hypotheses on status motives have been singled out. These hypotheses made the same predictions for upwardly mobile persons as did the two hypotheses on economic self-interest. For downwardly mobile persons the first status hypothesis predicted that these persons would maintain the political preference entirely of their category of origin. The other hypothesis on status is a weak version of the first one and predicted a small adaptation to the category of destination. According to this hypothesis downwardly mobile persons would show less adaptation to their destination status than upwardly mobile persons. Statistically

speaking, hypotheses on economic self-interest postulate additive effects and hypotheses on status motives additive as well as interaction effects.

For a proper test of these individual hypotheses, Sobel's diagonal models were applied. These models include parameters for specific additive and interaction effects postulated by the hypotheses in this paper. Three Dutch data sets of the 1970s were analysed. It was found that weak versions of hypotheses resulted in a better fit of data than strong ones, and that a weak version of an economic hypothesis was to be preferred over a weak version of a status hypothesis.

To apply both weak and strong versions of an individual hypothesis on economic self-interest when explaining a society's political outcome on the macrolevel, an auxiliary assumption on opportunity structures or competitive balances in the Netherlands is required. Since the Netherlands has a favourable opportunity structure, mobility might shift the Netherlands politically towards the right. As macroshifts, in the case of applicability of economic hypotheses, depend on mobility induced by opportunity structures and do not depend upon total observed mobility, and as total observed mobility is much higher than mobility forced by competitive imbalances, the extent of the shift should not be overestimated.

The data analysed in this paper only pertain to the Netherlands. Whether in other industrial nations hypotheses on economic self-interest explain voting behaviour of mobile persons better than status hypotheses, or whether the latter explain better than the former, remains to be seen. Yet some speculation may be made on research questions of current comparative research on social mobility.

The main sociological research program on comparative social mobility of the past decade is that of Erikson and Goldthorpe. In this program social mobility is conceived of as class mobility, that is, as mobility within a structure of economic classes. An elaborate argument justifies this choice for questions about movement between economic classes against an earlier choice within sociology in favour of questions on movements up and down an occupational prestige scale (Goldthorpe, 1985). When comparing social mobility of nations, this program of Erikson and Goldthorpe seeks to answer questions about rates of mobility (percentages of upward and downward mobility, total percentage of mobility) and social fluidity (Erikson *et al.*, 1983; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1985). This program not only deals with answers to questions about rates of mobility and social fluidity as interesting in their own right, but also sees answers to these questions as preliminaries to other questions. This is the case as the program, assuming that questions about the nature of mobility have been answered, raises questions about political consequences of mobility at a macrolevel (Goldthorpe, 1980: ch. 1 and 10; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1985).

The upshot of this paper for sociologists treating voting as one possible consequence of mobility is that the set of questions of Erikson and Goldthorpe's research program may be incomplete. As far as description and explanation of mobility patterns goes, this program intends to answer questions on total mobility and social fluidity, paying limited attention to questions about opportunity structures or competitive balances. Such a relative neglect is proper if mobility questions are taken to be questions about movements up and down a scale for occupational prestige. Indeed, one argument of this paper holds that if an individual's voting behaviour is determined by a status motive, macroconsequences of mobility for a society's political behaviour are determined by this society's total percentage of mobility. However, Erikson and Goldthorpe's research program seeks

to answer questions about mobility within a structure of economic classes. Another argument of this paper holds that if an individual's economic self-interest determines this person's voting behaviour, macroconsequences of mobility for a society's electoral outcome depend upon this society's opportunity structure or competitive balance. Yet Erikson and Goldthorpe's research program does not seek to answer questions about this aspect of a society's mobility pattern. This incompleteness in the set of questions of Erikson and Goldthorpe's research program might for this reason not be harmless. If it were to be found that voting behaviour of mobile persons in industrial nations other than the Netherlands is better explained by economic than by status hypotheses, this incompleteness amounts to a rather serious omission. A link would be missing in a chain of questions.

This paper's results have three implications for political scientists who regard mobility as one factor influencing electoral outcomes. First, that hypotheses about economic interest and individual voting behaviour yield predictions about the consequences of mobility differing from those obtained by hypotheses on status motives. Second, that diagonal models offer an adequate technique to test which one of these hypotheses is to be preferred. Third, that the distinction between total mobility (mobility rates) and the structure of opportunities should consistently be applied. If status motives determine individual voting behaviour, electoral outcomes depend on total mobility, whereas if economic interests are predominant, electoral outcomes only depend on the opportunity structure.

Notes

1. This hypothesis of Marx, however, is about intragenerational opportunity structures.
2. The auxiliary assumption that a society displays more upward than downward mobility is more or less a restatement of the auxiliary assumption that a society's competitive balance is favourable. This point will not be elaborated here.
3. This case-study paper does not attempt a more complicated log-linear analysis of mobility patterns. Examples of this type of analysis are Ganzeboom and de Graaf (1984) and Ganzeboom *et al.* (1987).
4. For extensive information concerning recordings of CBS codes into Van Tulder's categories, see Ganzeboom and de Graaf (1984: 90). For the 1970/71 surveys a slightly new recoding has been made, since codings of these surveys were in terms of an older occupational classification.
5. In the meantime a key for recoding Dutch CBS occupational codes into the EGP class scheme has appeared, see Ganzeboom *et al.*, 1987.
6. Diagonal models have been fitted by computer program BMDP3R. Within this program parameters have been specified by means of FORTRAN.
7. One might think that the conclusion that origin is more important than destination is open to criticism, since religion, an important dimension within Dutch society, is not included. However, it appeared that when the diagonal model is extended with religious affiliation as a covariate (cf. Sobel, 1985), this does not change the conclusion that origin is relatively more important than destination. This result to some extent answers the question whether Dutch politics may be described by one single left–right dimension.
8. Sobel's proposal for a test of whether one model differs significantly from another runs as follows: 'For such a comparison, one first computes the likelihood ratio $L=(\hat{rms}_f/\hat{rms}_n)^N$, where $\hat{rms}_f$ is the maximum likelihood estimate of *rms* in the more general model, $\hat{rms}_n$ is the maximum likelihood estimate of *rms* in the nested model, and N is the sample size. Next, the finding that $-2(\log L)$ has an asymptotic CHI^2 (r) distribution, where r is the number of additional independent paramcters in the general model, is used for comparing

the two models (Sobel, 1985: 705).

9. It is difficult to decide whether the difference between a residual mean square value of 1.65344 and 1.65012 is substantial, since the two models are not nested. However, it should be taken into consideration that, when comparing nested models, similar differences between residual mean squares are significant if the models were nested with 1 df difference.

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